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Abstract:  
We compare wealth holdings across two cohorts of the Health and Retirement Study: the 
early Baby Boomers in 2004, and individuals in the same age group in 1992. Levels and 
patterns of total net worth have changed relatively little over time, though Boomers rely more 
on housing equity than their predecessors. Most important, planners in both cohorts arrive 
close to retirement with much higher wealth levels and display higher financial literacy than 
non-planners. Instrumental variables estimates show that planning behavior can explain the 
differences in savings and why some people arrive close to retirement with very little or no 
wealth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The standard economic model of wealth accumulation posits that consumption 
decisions are made in a life-cycle framework, where consumption-smoothing requires 
one to save during the working years to support consumption after retirement.
1 
Specifically, this framework models the consumer as maximizing his discounted lifetime 
expected utility such that consumption flows and wealth stocks at each point depend on 
his permanent income, i.e., anticipated lifetime resources, as well as preference 
parameters.  To do so, the consumer must understand present discounted values, the 
difference between nominal and real amounts, and be able to project expected future 
labor income, pensions and social security benefits, retirement ages, and survival 
probabilities, among many other factors. These requirements are inherently complex and 
demanding.  
Our goal in this paper is to evaluate how successfully individuals plan for 
retirement, whether financial literacy is associated with better planning, and whether 
retirement preparedness is associated with these behaviors.  Specifically, in what follows, 
we provide new evidence regarding people’s economic knowledge and planning, and 
how these are associated with saving behavior.  The analysis uses two cohorts of data 
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in 2004 and 1992 to evaluate wealth on the 
verge of retirement. Three questions are of central interest: 
1)  What do the level and composition of wealth tell us about the financial position of 
the Baby Boomers compared to prior cohorts? 
2)  Are more sophisticated and financially literate individuals more likely to plan for 
retirement?   
3)  Does planning affect wealth accumulation? 
 
                                                 
1 See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a review.   3
  To address these issues, we first assess the level and distribution of wealth 
holdings of Baby Boomers on the verge of retirement, along with those of a comparable 
age group in 1992. Looking at both cohorts, we find that the median Boomer has more 
wealth than its precursor cohort a dozen years before, but those in the lowest quartile are 
less well off. We also show that housing equity is a key component of retirement assets, 
though the concentration of wealth in one asset leaves many Boomers vulnerable to 
fluctuations in the housing market. By contrast, holders of stocks, IRAs, and business 
equity are concentrated in the top quartiles of the wealth distribution.  We next assess 
alternative explanations for differences in household wealth, focusing on respondents’ 
planning efforts and the financial literacy they bring to solving the retirement problem.  
We show that financial literacy influences planning behavior and that planning, in turn, 
increases wealth holdings, even after controlling for many sociodemographic factors. 
Inasmuch as planning is an important predictor of saving and investment success, we 
believe we have identified an important explanation for why wealth holdings differ so 
much across households, and why some people enter retirement with very low amounts 
of wealth. 
 
2. An overview of pre-retirement wealth 
Our analysis draws on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a rich and detailed 
nationally representative survey of Americans over the age of 50 (and their spouses of 
any age). This survey was designed to track assets, liabilities, health, and patterns of 
wellbeing in older households both over time and across cohorts.
2  Beginning in 1992, the 
                                                 
2  http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/   4
survey has been administered every two years.
3  In this paper, we compare and contrast 
the experiences of what we call the “Early Baby Boomer” (EBB) cohort, where at least 
one household member was born between 1948 and 1953, with an earlier cohort first 
interviewed in 1992 (the 1992 HRS cohort). Both cohorts are selected to be in the 51-56 
age range at the time of the interview. The older sample totaled 4,580 and the EBB 
sample totaled 2,635 after we deleted a handful of households with missing observations 
or zero income. All statistics reported use HRS household weights and all values are 
expressed in 2004 dollars.  
Wealth for these respondents on the verge of retirement is measured in terms of 
their self-reported household total net worth; separately we also report home equity and 
non-housing/non-business wealth. Total net worth is a broad concept; it includes 
respondents’ checking and savings account balances, certificates of deposits and T-bills, 
bonds, stocks, IRAs and Keoghs, home equity, second homes and other real estate, 
business equity, vehicles, and other assets, minus all debt. Home equity refers to 
respondents’ net equity in their homes after subtracting mortgage debt. Non-business-non 
housing wealth is obtained by subtracting home and business equity from total net 
worth.
4  
The distribution of total net worth for both cohorts appears in Table 1. The wealth 
distribution is very skewed: Boomers’ median net worth is $152,000, while the mean is 
two and a half times greater (approximately $390,000).  The fact that wealth is distributed 
                                                 
3 A 90-minute core questionnaire is administered to age-eligible respondents and their spouses; in addition, 
the “financially knowledgeable” respondent is asked to report information on household finances.  
4 Two other important components of total retirement wealth not included here are Social Security and 
pension wealth. For a detailed analysis of the importance of pension and Social Security wealth, see 
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999). In future data releases, these components may be calculated from 
administrative records linked to respondent records, but they are not currently available.   5
quite unevenly is also seen in the fact that Boomers in the third quartile have more than 
10 times the wealth ($400,000) of households in the first quartile ($36,000). We also note 
that Boomers hold more wealth than the earlier cohort, but the improvement has not been 
uniform: in fact, Boomers in the lowest quartile of the wealth distribution have less 
wealth than their precursor counterparts.
5  
One reason Boomers have more net worth is because they have more housing 
equity; overall, the median amount of housing equity is $68,000 for the EBB group, with 
a mean value twice this amount. At the mean, one-third of the early Boomers’ wealth is 
held in the form of home equity, and at the median the fraction is close to half. That is, 
many Americans currently on the verge of retirement have accumulated little wealth 
outside their homes. Note that housing equity still represents a crucial component of net 
worth (close to one-third) for even the wealthiest respondents.
6 In the third column of 
Table 1, when both housing and business wealth are excluded from the net worth 
computation, a sizeable fraction of the Boomers turn out to have either zero or negative 
net wealth (for instance, due to credit card and other loans). Indeed, if we focus only on 
net worth without housing and business equity, the median Early Boomer holds less 
wealth than the prior cohort.  A final observation from Table 1 is that the wealthiest 
households in both cohorts are disproportionately business owners; when we omit 
business equity from net worth, the right tail of the wealth distribution displays much less 
extreme values.
7 
                                                 
5 This confirms earlier findings (Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Moore and Mitchell, 2000). 
6 Given that home values are self-reported, one may wonder about the accuracy of these reports. Bucks and 
Pence (2006) compare household self-reported housing data with lender-reported data. They find that most 
homeowners appear to report their house value and rate of house price appreciation accurately. 
7 See also Gentry and Hubbard (2004) and Hurst and Lusardi (2006).   6
The heterogeneity in wealth observed for both cohorts remains large even within 
socio-economic groups. For instance, Table 2 (Panel A) depicts total net worth by 
educational attainment and highlights the very steep wealth-education gradient; the 
median Boomer respondent with less than a high school education has less than $22,000 
in total net worth, whereas respondents with a high school degree have almost four times 
as much, and respondents with a college degree have fourteen times as much. It is also 
important to highlight the dispersion in wealth within given education groups. For 
example, considering only those with a high school degree, respondents in the third 
quartile hold more than 15 times as much wealth as those in the first quartile. The wealth 
gradient is flattest (but still sizable) for the most educated; the third/first quartile wealth 
ratio is 5 times among those with a college degree.  
Other pronounced wealth differences are also evident in Table 2 where we break 
down the results by race and ethnicity, marital status, and sex. One striking result within 
the EBB is that the median White household reports close to $200,000 in total net worth, 
whereas the Black household’s net worth value is one-eighth as large ($25,000), and the 
net worth of Hispanic households is one third as large ($56,000). The third/first quartile 
wealth gradient at 7.3 for Whites is much flatter than for Blacks and Hispanics. Another 
large difference stands out among different marital status groupings.  For instance, the 
median married respondent has over four times the total net worth of the median 
nonmarried respondent (where the latter group includes separated, divorced, widowed, 
and never married individuals). Lack of resources is also a stark concern for the 
nonmarrieds, with the bottom quartile having only $3000 in total net worth.  Respondents   7
with children (most of the EBB sample) have accumulated more wealth than the 
childless, and male respondents report much higher net worth than female respondents. 
Comparing Boomers with their predecessors, we see that some demographic 
groups are doing worse in terms of their wealth holdings  when compared to the earlier 
cohorts (Table 2, Panel B). For example, EBBs without a college degree display lower 
wealth than the 1992 cohort. Wealth holdings are lower throughout the wealth 
distribution. Blacks in 2004 have accumulated less wealth compared to 1992, and so have 
those households in the lower quartiles of the income distribution. 
Next, we turn to the composition of wealth. Table 3 shows again that one of the 
most important assets held by both cohorts is the home. Not only are most EBB and 
members of the 1992 cohorts homeowners, but home equity accounts for a third of total 
net worth among the EBBs.  When we sum together home equity and other real estate (an 
asset most prominent among wealthier households), the amount of wealth accounted for 
by total real estate is 47 percent for EBB, while it was 43.8 percent for the earlier cohort. 
Thus, exposure to the housing market has risen for the EBB group, as compared to the 
1992 HRS cohort. 
 Two other important assets in the portfolios of both cohorts are stocks and IRAs 
or Keoghs. However, most households do not hold large amounts of wealth in this form; 
the share of wealth accounted for by stocks is 12 percent among Boomers, up from 8 
percent among the HRS cohort. The share of IRAs and Keoghs is similar but slightly 
lower (10.6 percent for the EBBs and 7.5 percent for the HRS cohort). If all IRAs were 
invested in equities, more than 22 percent of EBBs’ wealth would be invested in stocks, 
while only  about 16 percent of the earlier cohort’s wealth was invested in the stock   8
market. Thus, in addition to holding more housing, Boomers are also more exposed to the 
stock market than the HRS cohort.  
 
2.1 Vulnerability to wealth shocks 
As just noted, housing wealth emerges as a key component of saving for many 
Americans on the verge of retirement. Not only is the rate of homeownership very high 
for Boomers, but their homes are also one of the few assets held broadly, across 
educational levels and across all ethnic/racial minority groups. In view of the upward 
trend in housing prices over the last decades, some have suggested that housing is good 
way to finance retirement, particularly for Boomers who have benefited from widespread 
appreciation of home equity.
 8  Yet macroeconomic and monetary policymakers should 
be concerned with this reliance on housing values to finance retirement, since a sharp 
interest rate rise could induce a “hard landing” in housing values, and many Boomer 
households could then experience substantial wealth losses.  
To help evaluate the importance of this possibility, we have modeled what would 
happen to Baby Boomers if housing prices in each region were to return to their 2002 
levels. Inasmuch as home prices rose substantially over the 2002-3 period, this exercise 
would imply an average national housing price drop of 13.5% (Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight, 2005).  Our simulation computes how much wealth would change 
for the EBBs if real estate prices (of home, second home and other real estate) declined 
by as much as they rose in the respondent’s own Census region over the period.  Our 
                                                 
8 For instance, Edmunds and Keene (2005) urge readers to “use your home to finance your 
retirement…Forgot to save for retirement, but bought a house? Saved a lot and also bought a house? 
Whatever your situation, (we) can show you how to best use your home equity for a long and prosperous 
retirement.”   9
results suggest that a shock of this magnitude would be substantial for Boomers; 10% of 
their total net worth would be lost.  Furthermore, for the median household, net worth 
would fall by 13.7%. This finding clearly reinforces the fact that Boomers are quite 
vulnerable to housing market shocks. 
A related issue to consider when assessing EBB wealth is whether this generation 
anticipates using home equity to finance their retirement.  Prior waves of retirees have 
not downsized their homes at retirement nor have they taken up reverse mortgages (Venti 
and Wise 1990, 1991).  There is, however, some evidence that home equity is a buffer 
used in the event of widowhood and to finance long-term care.  And not surprisingly, 
whether one includes or excludes housing equity has a substantive effect on measures of 
Baby Boomers’ financial wellbeing (Bernheim, 1993; CBO, 1993).   
In view of the rise in home equity values for Boomers, the role of housing in 
financing retirement has the potential to be even more important than in the past. Of 
course, we do not know yet whether and how this cohort will draw down home equity in 
retirement, though it may be of interest to ask households what they expect to do. To this 
end, we devised a special module for the 2004 HRS,
9 where we asked homeowners the 
following question:  
“On (a) scale from 0 to 100, where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 
equals absolutely certain, what are the chances that you will sell your 
house to finance your [(and your (husband/wife/partner)’s] retirement?” 
 
Answers to the question are reported in Figure 1 which summarizes results for all 
respondents aged 50 and over in the 2004 HRS module (not just those in the EBB group); 
the results are also similar for respondents age 50-70. Some 60% of homeowners 
affirmed that they did not plan to sell their homes to finance retirement, and almost 70% 
                                                 
99 For detail on this module and the questions we have inserted in it, see Lusardi and Mitchell (2006).   10
of respondents felt there was a minimal (10% or less) chance they would sell their homes 
to pay for retirement.  In other words, most older Americans do not plan to sell their 
homes to finance additional retirement expenses, though naturally this store of wealth 
helps cover housing consumption needs. In what follows, we both include and exclude 
net housing equity in the measures of wealth considered.
10 
We also analyze the potential distributional implications of a macro shock 
affecting the stock market instead of the housing market.  Consider, for instance, how a 
stock market decline of 10% would influence Boomer wealth. Even if we assume that all 
IRA assets are held in stock (in addition to direct stock holdings), only 2% of their wealth 
would be lost in this event.
11 The drop in median wealth would be even smaller, only 
1.1%.  Essentially the small impact is explained by the fact that most Boomers do not 
hold equities, and those who do, hold small amounts.  
 
2.2. Issues regarding business ownership 
Earlier research has shown that business owners are very different from other 
members of the population.
12 As noted above, business owners are disproportionately 
found at the top of the wealth distribution and they are a very heterogeneous group. For 
                                                 
10 Since this question is asked to older respondents, responses could simply reflect that (at least some) 
households have enough wealth for retirement and do not need to sell their house. In other words, answers 
to these questions may be influenced by the wealth households currently have. Unfortunately, we do not 
have data for young respondents. 
11 The study by Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) comes to a similar conclusion.  
12 See Hurst and Lusardi (2004, 2006) and Hurst, Lusardi, Kennickell and Torralba (2005). As Hurst and 
Lusardi (2004, 2006) have shown, business owners are more likely to be male, white, and married, and they 
also are more likely to come from families of business owners or highly educated families. They also have 
stronger ties with family and relatives; and they are more likely to have received and also to give money to 
family and relatives. Most importantly, business owners may display different motives to save than the rest 
of the population; they are not only much more likely to state they wish to leave a bequest to heirs but they 
are also less likely to be covered by pensions.  Business owners may also need to maintain large amounts of 
working capital both to deal with necessities of their business and to maintain effective control over the 
business.  Moreover, if households are compensated for taking greater risks with higher returns, it is again 
not surprising that business owners have higher wealth holdings than non-business owners.   11
example, 14% of business owners indicate they have no business equity, but median 
business equity is $50,000 and those at the very top hold as much as $20 million.  
Moreover, business owners hold a great deal of wealth in their businesses; over 40% of 
them hold a quarter or more of their wealth in this form.
13  
As in the case of housing, it is unclear whether business owners think of their 
business equity as an asset they will use to finance their retirement, and whether they plan 
to sell off their businesses when they retire. A large fraction of business owners explicitly 
state they will never retire completely (Hurst and Lusardi, 2006); since many business 
owners are self-employed, it is accordingly difficult to characterize exactly what 
“retirement” might entail for this group. There are also important measurement problems 
that arise when studying business owners. Tax evasion may drive some to underreport 
their income, and legal tax avoidance mechanisms can induce some owners to retain a 
portion of their compensation within their business.
14  The percentage of business owners 
has fallen between the two cohorts, and so too has the share of total wealth invested in 
business equity (Table 3).  Because we cannot fully account for all the nuances associated 
with business ownership, we exclude business owners in the multivariate analysis of 
savings. 
 
3. Planning and wealth 
One aspect of saving patterns that has received little attention to date is the fact 
that saving decisions are complex, requiring consumers to possess substantial economic 
knowledge and information. Our previous paper (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006) used a 
                                                 
13 See also Gentry and Hubbard (2004). 
14 Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) also emphasize the many tax incentives in business ownership.   12
special module covering a subset of 2004 HRS respondents and demonstrated that only a 
small fraction (less than a one-third) of older respondents ever tried to figure out how 
much they needed to save for retirement. The fraction of older persons reporting they not 
only tried but actually succeeded in developing a saving plan is even smaller (18%).
15  
One presumption of the theoretical life-cycle model of saving is that consumers 
are forward-looking and make plans for the future. To assess the empirical evidence for 
this point, we now focus on how much people have thought about retirement.  The 
wording of the question in the HRS is as follows: 
How much have you thought about retirement?  A lot, some, a little, or hardly at all? 
Results for both cohorts are presented in Table 4 (Panels A and B). As many as 
28% of the early Boomers report that they have not thought about retirement at all, 
slightly fewer than the 32% in the 1992 HRS cohort.
16 The fact that few people plan for 
retirement is also support by many other studies which show that older workers are 
woefully underinformed about their old-age benefits. Indeed in the 1990s, only half of 
prior HRS cohorts could identify what type of pension plan they had (defined benefit, 
defined contribution, or hybrid) and fewer than half could identify when they would be 
eligible for early or normal retirement benefits (see also Mitchell,1988; Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2004). Information about Social Security is also scanty. Only two-fifths of 
earlier HRS respondents could venture a guess about their expected Social Security 
benefits and many respondents knew little about program rules; over half of current 
workers expect to become eligible for full Social Security benefits at younger ages than 
                                                 
15 For additional evidence of lack of retirement planning, see Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003), Ameriks, Caplin 
and Leahy (2003) and Yakoboski and Dickemper (1997). 
16 Some households are not asked this question (for example, those who state they will never retire are not 
asked this question), so percentages refer to those who were asked. In our multivariate analysis, we add a 
dummy for this group of non-respondents.   13
are actually feasible (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004; 2001 Employee Benefits Research 
Institute’s Retirement Confidence Survey). Overall, households are quite uninformed 
about many of the key variables that should enter well-reasoned saving plans (Bernheim, 
1998). 
Also clear in Table 4 is the bimodal relationship between effort devoted to 
planning and household net worth. That is, those who report they undertook any planning 
– even “a little” – are much better off than those who said they planned “hardly at all.” In 
other words, undertaking even a little planning is associated with sizable wealth holdings, 
while non-planners display less wealth. The same pattern is present among the 1992 
cohort. In other words, regardless of changes in home and stock prices, failure to plan for 
retirement for both cohorts is tantamount to having very little retirement savings. To 
highlight that planners hold substantially more wealth, we group households into two 
types: planners (those who have thought a lot, some, or a little about retirement) and non-
planners (those who have thought hardly at all about retirement). At the median, planners 
hold double the amount of wealth of non-planners; differences are slightly less at the 
means. This is because there are a number of high-wealth households who do not plan for 
retirement.   
We also find that nonplanners are disproportionately concentrated among the least 
educated, and among Blacks and Hispanics.
17  As shown in Table 2, these groups are also 
those with the lowest wealth levels. Next, we show that planning may provide an 
explanation for the differences in wealth holdings and why some households arrive close 
to retirement with little or no wealth. 
                                                 
17 For brevity, tables are not reported. For a detailed analysis of planning across cohorts and demographic 
groups, see Lusardi and Beeler (2006).   14
 
3.1 Planning and financial literacy 
One reason people fail to plan is because they are financially unsophisticated.  
Our prior research explored whether older respondents display basic financial literacy 
(Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). Those results are not encouraging: half the respondents 
surveyed in our module cannot make a simple calculation regarding interest rates over a 
5-year period and do not know the difference between nominal and real interest rates. An 
even larger percentage of respondents do not know that holding a single company stock is 
riskier than holding a stock mutual fund. 
To pursue this question further in the present context we turn to the 2004 HRS, 
where respondents are presented with several questions that we use to assess financial 
and political literacy.
 18 Three financial literacy questions are asked, as follows: 
1) “If the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent, how many people out of 1,000 
would be expected to get the disease”? 
 
2) “If 5 people all have the winning number in the lottery and the prize is 2 
million dollars, how much will each of them get?” 
 
For respondents who give the correct answer to either the first or the second question, the 
following question is then asked: 
3) “Let’s say you have 200 dollars in a savings account. The account earns 10 
percent interest per year. How much would you have in the account at the end of 
two years?” 
 
For each case, if the respondent gets the answer correctly, we set the answer equal to 1, 
and 0 otherwise. These are recoded as “Percentage Calculation,” “Lottery Division,” and 
                                                 
18 Questions are also available on respondents’ success at counting backward and subtracting 7 from 100 
five times. The answers to these calculations are highly correlated with the questions we take up in the text. 
Because these questions do not refer to economic calculations, we have not included them in our empirical 
analysis.   15
“Compound Interest” variables respectively.  We also define a “Political Literacy” 
variable equal to 1 if the respondent correctly knows the names of the US President and 
Vice President; this is likely to capture respondents’ awareness of future tax and 
macroeconomic prospects.
19  
Table 5 summarizes how this group of Boomers answered the economic and 
political literacy questions.  While more than 80% got the percentage calculation right, 
only about half got the lottery division right. Only 18% could correctly compute 
compound interest; of those who got the compound interest wrong, 43% undertook a 
simple interest calculation thereby overlooking the interest which accrues on both 
principal and interest.  Also note that a fifth of the sample could not name either the US 
President or Vice President.
20 
Further detail on financial literacy appears in Figure 2, which reports the 
distribution of correct responses for respondents in different educational and racial/ethnic 
groups. For all four measures, literacy rises steeply with education: the more educated are 
much more likely to answer the economic and political literacy queries correctly. These 
differences are statistically significant. Blacks and Hispanics are less likely to answer 
correctly than Whites (again differences are statistically significant), which may not be 
surprising as the former groups report lower wealth levels. Nevertheless, there are also 
sharp cross-question variations. For instance, all three racial/ethnic groups score over 
50% on the percentage calculation, and all three score low on the compound interest 
                                                 
19 These questions were asked only of respondents who entered the sample in 2004, so we lose 
approximately 600 observations when we consider these data. 
20 Similar results about lack of financial literacy are reported by Bernheim (1985, 1988), Hogarth and 
Hilgert (2002), Hilgert, Hogarth and Beverly (2003), Moore (2003), Mandell (2004), and the National 
Council on Economic Education (2005).   16
question. These findings suggest that the HRS questions may be able to capture different 
types of financial savvy.  
Table 6 reports Probit estimates of the effect of literacy on planning (being a 
planner is defined, as mentioned before, as having thought about retirement a little, some, 
or a lot). Across the board, financial literacy is important for planning. The most 
important variable, quantitatively, is the one reflecting knowledge of interest 
compounding, which makes sense inasmuch as it is critical for saving plans. It is also 
worth disaggregating those who answer correctly, those who answer incorrectly, and 
those who do not know the answers, so we can distinguish between knowledge versus 
lack thereof. People who are unable to divide the lottery winnings are less likely to be 
planners, and the effect is quantitatively important. Moreover, the knowledge of interest 
compounding and the inability to do simple calculations still have an impact on planning, 
even after accounting for demographic factors including education, race, marital status, 
number of children, retirement status, and sex.  
 
3.2 The role of planning in retirement wealth accumulation 
By influencing planning patterns, financial literacy may influence household 
saving outcomes. Several explanations might account for the empirical observation that 
planning is associated with higher retirement wealth. For instance, planning may be a 
proxy for personal attributes such as patience, diligence, or other factors associated with 
having a low discount rate – which are also likely to be associated with wealth.  In this 
case, one might anticipate that controlling for socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics in multivariate wealth regressions would produce a cleaner estimate of the   17
planning effect. To investigate the importance of this explanation in our dataset, we 
examine whether the positive relationship between levels of wealth and planning 
described in Table 4 persists after controlling for factors conventionally thought to 
determine wealth.  Here we focus on total net worth and also on non-housing, non-
business wealth; in addition we examine housing wealth in view of the widespread 
pattern of homeownership and the importance of housing in total wealth.  We drop 
business owners from the sample and trim the bottom and top 1% of the wealth 
distribution to exclude outliers. 
Our empirical strategy in Table 7 first controls for the conventional determinants 
of wealth likely to be associated with household permanent income and preferences. 
These include variables measuring respondents’ educational attainment, sex, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, age, number of children, retirement status (whether fully or 
partly retired), and household income (in natural logs).
21  Our strategy then adds to this 
canonical set of regressors a new determinant of wealth, namely the respondent’s self-
report of whether he is a planner. The test we perform is whether planning is associated 
with wealth outcomes after controlling for the conventional factors associated with 
saving.  Further, by pooling the EBB and 1992 HRS samples, we can examine the effect 
of planning over time. The year dummy and the interaction between the year and the 
planner dummy test whether the wealth/planning relationship is changing over time. 
Inasmuch as wealth distributions are skewed, we perform both OLS and median 
regressions. 
The estimates in Table 7 show that planning is strongly positively associated with 
higher total net worth in this multivariate framework. Thus, planning continues to have 
                                                 
21 Taking the log of income downweights outliers.   18
an effect on wealth, even after accounting for many demographic factors. The planning 
effect in columns 1-2 is sizable and does not change across cohorts: the median 
regression estimates indicate that those who plan accumulate close to 20% more total net 
worth, while the mean regressions indicate that those who plan accumulate 13% more 
wealth. For non-housing wealth (columns 3-4), the impact is larger; the median and mean 
estimates indicate that planners accumulate 32% and 19% more wealth respectively. 
Turning to home equity (columns 5-6), we note that those who plan accumulate 16% 
more wealth in home equity (median estimates). Other variables have the impacts that 
might be anticipated: both education and race/ethnicity remain strongly associated with 
wealth levels.  Specifically, those with at least some college have far more wealth than 
those who did not complete high school, and Blacks have far less wealth than Whites, all 
else equal. Married couples have higher wealth and so do high income households, other 
factors constant.
22  
 
3.3. Does planning affect wealth or does wealth affect planning? 
These estimates confirm that planners accumulate larger amounts of wealth than 
nonplanners. But if planning is correlated with unobservable character traits which cannot 
readily be controlled for, the measured planning effect might not be a true measure of the 
causal relationship we seek to assess.  While this argument has some theoretical merit, it 
does not match findings from other studies. For example, Lusardi (1999, 2002, 2003) 
adds a long list of controls to wealth regressions to proxy for individual characteristics. 
She also adds subjective expectations about Social Security, house prices, and expected 
                                                 
22 We have also tried different empirical specifications. For example, we added controls for risk aversion 
and controls for subjective expectations about longevity and Social Security. Our main results remain 
unchanged and for brevity, we do not include these results in the table.   19
retirement ages. Her estimates of planning remain positive and statistically significant. 
Moreover, when she instruments for planning using the difference between the 
respondent’s age and the age of his older siblings (a measure of planning costs), she 
concludes that the planning effects are again positive and statistically significant but even 
larger. Similar findings are offered by Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003). 
  Another possible confound is that planning may reduce uncertainty concerning 
future asset returns and future income. However, this works in the “wrong” direction, in 
that less uncertainty should lead to less rather than more wealth as the precautionary 
saving motive decreases. Ameriks, Caplin and Leahy (2003) have data on measures of 
subjective uncertainty about income in their TIAA-CREF survey, but find little evidence 
that planners display lower subjective uncertainty concerning future income. 
Yet another way in which planning may affect wealth is via portfolio choice.  For 
instance, the financially and politically illiterate, who are less likely to plan, may also be 
unlikely to invest in high-return or tax-favored assets. This would lead to low savings, if 
combined with an elasticity of intertemporal substitution less than one. This view is 
consistent with Lusardi’s (2003) evidence that planning increases stock ownership. 
A different explanation about how planning might affect wealth is addressed by 
psychological research on self-control. If consumers want to save but simply lack the 
self-discipline to do so, planning might help consumers control their consumption 
(Ameriks, Caplin, Leahy, and Taylor, 2004).  Related work by Gollwitzer (1996, 1999) 
demostrates experimentally that people are more likely to achieve goals and translate 
their intentions into actions when they develop concrete plans. One striking finding from 
the psychological research is that a simple planning activity, such as getting experimental   20
subjects to write down the specific steps they will take to implement a task, can greatly 
increase follow-through. These successes may help explain why merely thinking about 
retirement can produce wide differences in retirement wealth. Moreover, it may explain 
the bimodal distribution of wealth observed in Table 4, and why even “a little” or “some” 
planning generates large wealth differences, as compared to those who did not think 
about retirement at all. 
Nevertheless, the causality may go the other way: for instance, wealthier 
households may plan more because they have more to gain by planning. On the other 
hand, wealthier households might not plan because they do not need to; they may already 
have enough for retirement. To assess the possible importance of such reverse causality 
in our sample of households nearing retirement, we first examine a regression where the 
dependent variable is being a planner, and then control for the same variables as 
examined previously in Table 7, with the addition of wealth. OLS estimates in Table 8 
indicate that the scope for such a reverse causality effect is small: indeed, a wealth 
increase of $1,000 would be interpreted as boosting the probability of planning only by 
less than 0.1 percentage point.   
A further test must consider “exogenous” variations in wealth. In other words, we 
require an instrumental variable which is uncorrelated with unmeasured unobservables in 
the error term but correlated with wealth.  We believe that an ideal instrument to assess 
the impact of wealth on planning is available from the housing market. In both 1992 and 
2004, there were substantial changes in the housing market: in 1992, the economy was at 
the end of a housing price bust, whereas in 2004, the economy experienced a housing 
boom. In both instances, regional housing prices changed substantially across the US,   21
creating changes in household wealth for reasons unrelated to individual unobservable 
characteristics. As an example, home prices rose between 2003 and 2004 by 10.3% in the 
Pacific region, but only 3.6% in the South. In 1992, the housing bust was particularly 
pronounced in New England, and less serious elsewhere. Accordingly, we use as an 
instrument for wealth the regional housing price changes in the previous year (2003-04 
for the EBB; 1991-92 for the 1992 HRS cohort).  We also note that changes in home 
prices affect more than home equity values; with the development of home equity lines of 
credit, increased home equity can easily be accessed by households.
23  
Regional housing price changes are a good predictor of respondents’ net worth. 
The first-stage estimate of housing price changes is +12.729 with a standard error of 
1.483; this implies that a 1% housing price increase raised wealth by over $12,000.
24  Yet 
the instrumental variable estimates in Table 8 reveal that the effect of wealth on planning 
is not statistically significant. Considering each cohort separately, the effect of wealth is 
either statistically insignificant or negative.
 In other words, when people grow wealthier, 
they tend to plan less (and some wealthy households do not plan at all).
25 This 
underscores the fact that the OLS estimates of planning on wealth reported in Table 7 
most likely underestimate the full effect of planning on wealth. 
 
4. Conclusions   
This paper takes several new steps in linking workers’ financial literacy to their 
success at retirement planning and their accumulation of retirement wealth.  First, we 
                                                 
23 Hurst and Stafford (1994) document that households are willing to borrow (and lenders willing to lend) 
when capital gains on housing rise. 
24 When we perform this regression in each year separately, we find that the first-stage estimate of housing 
price changes is +18.619 (s.e. 2.562) in 2004 and -2.936 (s.e. 1.626) in 1992.  
25 See Lusardi and Beeler (2006) for detail.   22
compare the net worth of the early Baby Boomer cohort in 2004 with that of another 
cohort of the same age (51-56) in another period of time (1992). We find that Boomers 
have higher levels of net worth than the previous cohort, principally because they hold 
more housing wealth. We also identify key differences in the distribution of wealth and 
conclude that the poorest Boomers are actually worse off than their earlier counterparts. 
The fact that wealth is very low for Blacks, and Hispanics, and the least educated did not 
change over time. In part this may be due to low levels of financial literacy among these 
groups. 
Second, we show that respondents who report they planned for retirement enter 
their golden years with higher wealth levels. We further show that planning is strongly 
correlated with financial and political literacy and that the relationship between planning 
and wealth remains strong, even after controlling for many sociodemographic factors. We 
explore the possibility that it is wealth that affects planning rather than planning that 
affects wealth, but our statistical tests indicate this is not the case.  
We believe that our research findings are particularly relevant in the current 
policy environment. For some time there has been substantial employer interest regarding 
ways to enhance worker retirement security. To this end, some firms have offered their 
employees retirement seminars (Lusardi, 2004), and financial advice provision has been 
made more feasible by the new Pension Protection Act of 2006.  While some contend that 
such programs cannot do much to enhance retirement savings, our analysis implies that 
planning can actually jump-start the retirement saving process. A one-size-fits-all 
approach is unlikely to do much to build retirement wealth, and education programs must 
be targeted specifically to particular subgroups. Nevertheless, differences in planning   23
behavior do help explain why household retirement assets differ, and why some people 
cross the retirement threshold with very low (or no) wealth. 
As recently noted by Campbell (2006), it is often difficult for consumers to 
exhibit carefully-reasoned and informed economic decisions:  
“[F]or many households, the discrepancies between observed and ideal 
behavior have relatively minor consequences and can easily be 
rationalized by small frictions that are ignored in standard finance 
theory. For a minority of households, however, particularly poorer and 
less educated households, there are larger discrepancies with 
potentially serious consequences.”   
 
Our findings provide support for this statement and highlight the fact that specific groups in 
the economy, particularly those with low education, low income and Black and Hispanic 
households, are at risk of not preparing adequately for their retirement. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Total Net Worth and Wealth Components ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004 (N=2,635) 
 
Percentile  Total  
Net Worth ($) 
 
Housing  
Equity ($) 
 
Non-housing Non- 
business Wealth ($) 
5
th  -3,500 0 -8,850 
10
th  100 0 -300 
25
th  36,000 7,000  7,000 
 
50
th 
 
152,000 
 
68,000 
 
47,500 
75
th  400,000 160,000 190,200 
90
th  891,000 300,000 534,000 
95
th  1,327,000 430,000  886,000 
Mean  387,690 127,280 220,700 
Std  Dev. 960,350 296,200 674,500 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992 (N= 4,580) 
 
Percentile  Total  
Net Worth ($) 
 
Housing  
Equity ($) 
 
Non-housing Non- 
business Wealth ($) 
5
th  0 0  -1,890 
10
th  1,350 0  0 
25
th  40,660 6,730  8,750 
 
50
th 
 
136,260 
 
60,590 
 
49,140 
75
th  315,060 121,180 162,240 
90
th  700,130 215,420 420,080 
95
th  1,218,500 290,820  768,800 
Mean 327,650 88,560 184,230 
Std  Dev. 737,950 146,400 496,310 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.    30
Table 2: Total Net Worth by Demographic Group ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004  (N=2,635) 
 
Group  25
th Percentile  Median   Mean  
 
75
th  
Percentile 
N  
Education 
   < HS  3  21,400  100,380 78,000  327 
  HS Graduate  15,374  88,500  215,637 243,000  745 
  Some College  34,000  133,000  278,665 319,085  757 
College Graduate  140,000  302,000  664,197 691,000  448 
  >College  168,000  365,000  786,232 845,000  358 
Race 
   White  62,800  199,000  457,850 463,000 1,741 
   Black  0  25,000  120,351 115,000  454 
   Hispanic  5,000  55,800  176,718 200,000  186 
   Other   9,000  70,000  236,852 250,000  254 
Marital Status 
   Married  85,000  223,000  499,557 498,000 1,622 
   Non-Married  2,750  52,500  201,313 199,000 1,013 
Children 
   None  26,000  122,300  366,596 370,000  316 
   Some   37,000  157,000  390,836 404,000 2,319 
Sex 
   Male  55,000  194,000  485,898 481,000 1,346 
   Female  20,000  104,000  271,358 297,500 1,289 
Income 
   1
st Quartile  25  20,000  103,119 89,500  749 
   2
nd Quartile  31,000  95,000  190,163 223,200  683 
   3
rd Quartile  95,000  194,000  317,214 379,010  610 
   4
th Quartile  240,000  462,700  939,941 991,000  593 
   31
Table 2 (continued) 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992 (N= 4,580) 
 
Group  25
th 
Percentile 
Median   Mean  
 
75
th  
Percentile 
N  
Education 
  < HS  1,346  41,065  147,057 118,483 1,007 
 HS Graduate  39,719  121,176  242,715 256,489 1,740 
Some College  67,051  166,954  363,286 352,084  926 
  College Graduate  117,137  257,163  516,428 556,467  479 
   >College  149,451  291,361  687,753 706,860  428 
Race 
   White  60,588  166,550  377,153 368,241 3,221 
   Black  337  36,487  109,963 115,117  814 
   Hispanic  2,693  46,047  108,162 126,562  414 
   Other   1,077  151,470  250,052 297,555  131 
Marital Status 
   Married  72,706  173,686  385,171 376,319 3,310 
   Non-Married  2,558  51,836  183,899 172,339 1,270 
Children 
   None  32,987  130,601  369,600 309,672  378 
   Some   41,604  136,781  323,603 315,058 4,202 
Sex 
   Male  58,568  166,954  398,210 368,914 2,500 
   Female  20,869  102,326  238,805 249,263 2,080 
Income 
   1
st Quartile  942  27,534  111,810 101,047 1,266 
   2
nd Quartile  41,065  102,024  198,969 219,463 1,174 
   3
rd Quartile  89,266  170,320  295,801 316,404 1,112 
   4
th Quartile  165,473  329,195  703,614 667,142 1,028 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.    32
Table 3: Asset Ownership and Percentage of Wealth Accounted for by Each Asset 
(%) 
 
Group  Home   Real 
Estate  
Stock IRA Own   
Business 
% with Asset Ownership 
1992  78.6 24.8 30.6  40.6  19.0 
2004  79.9 17.1 30.9  41.5  14.7 
t-stat of diff 
  (p value) 
1.34 
(0.18) 
-7.95 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.75) 
0.79 
(0.43) 
-4.77 
(0.00) 
% of Net Worth Accounted For By That Asset 
1992 27.0  16.8  8.3  7.5  16.7 
2004  32.8 14.2 12.1  10.6  10.2 
 
Note: All data are weighted using HRS household weights. N in 1992 = 4,577; in 2004 = 2,635.   33
Table 4: Distribution of Net Worth by Planning ($2004) 
 
A. Early Baby Boomers: Age 51-56 in 2004 
 
Group  % of 
Sample 
25
th Percentile
 
Median 
 
Mean 
 
75
th Percentile
Planning 
Hardly at  
All 
27.9%  9,000  79,000  315,579 271,000 
A Little 
 
17.0%  62,800  173,400  356,552 390,500 
Some 
 
27.7%  51,000  189,000  365,354 447,200 
A Lot 
 
27.4%  54,000  199,000  517,252 470,000 
 
B. 1992 HRS Cohort: Age 51-56 in 1992  
 
Group  % of 
Sample 
25
th Percentile Median  Mean  75
th Percentile
Planning 
Hardly at  
All 
32.0  10,100  76,910  224,3110 200,610 
A Little 
 
14.3  37,700  126,560  343,110 292,170 
Some 
 
24.8  71,360  172,340  340,340 367,300 
A Lot 
 
28.9  71,390  173,690  353,520 356,800 
 
Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights.    34
Table 5:  Financial Literacy Among Early Baby Boomers  
(N=1,984) 
 
Question Type  Correct (%)  Incorrect (%)  Do Not Know (%) 
Percentage 
Calculation 
83.5 13.2  2.8 
 
Lottery 
Division 
55.9 34.4  8.7 
 
Compound 
Interest* 
17.8 78.5  3.2 
Political 
Literacy 
81.1 11.0  7.7 
 
Notes: * Conditional on being asked the question.  The percentages do not sum to 100 due to a very small 
fraction of respondents who refused to answer the literacy questions. All data weighted using HRS 
household weights.  
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Table 6:  Probit Analysis of the Effect of Financial Literacy on Planning  
Marginal Effects Reported (N=1,716)  
 
  Planners 
 
  1 2  3 
Correct Percentage Calculation 
 
-.016 
(.061) 
-.012 
(.062) 
-.034 
(.060) 
Correct Lottery Division 
 
.059* 
(.030) 
.034 
(.031) 
.001 
(.032) 
Correct Compound Interest 
 
.153*** 
(.035) 
.149*** 
(.035) 
.114*** 
(.039) 
Correct Political Literacy 
 
.104*** 
(.032) 
.084** 
(.040) 
.016 
(.042) 
DK Percentage Calculation 
 
 .021 
(.068) 
.054 
(.067) 
DK Lottery Division 
 
 -.154*** 
(.050) 
-.141*** 
(.051) 
DK Compound Interest 
 
 -.114 
(.080) 
-.073 
(.081) 
DK Political Literacy 
 
 -.019 
(.053) 
-.016 
(.054) 
Demographic controls  No  No  Yes 
Pseudo R
2 .031  .038  .074 
 
Note:  Sample includes EBB members who responded to financial literacy question. Other controls include 
age, education, race, sex, marital status, retirement status, number of children. All regressions include a 
dummy for those who were not asked the question about interest compounding. DK indicates respondents 
who did not know the answer. All data weighted using HRS household weights. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     36 
Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Total Net Worth, Non-housing Wealth, and Home Equity on Planning 
Pooled Sample, EBB and 1992 HRS 
 
         Net Worth             Non-housing Wealth        Home Equity      
  Median  Regression  OLS    Median  Regression  OLS    Median  Regression  OLS_________ 
 
Planning  21.995***   30.180**   12.631***   24.788**   8.701***   5.392 
  (6.014)    (12.326)   (2.179)    (9.778)    (2.519)    (5.335) 
Year2004  7.968    41.552***   0.476    16.789*   7.367**   24.763*** 
  (7.320)    (12.009)   (2.660)    (9.526)    (3.058)    (5.197) 
Plan*Year04  -0.967    5.949    -2.926    9.512    -0.448    -3.563 
  (9.070)    (14.897)   (3.290)    (11.817)   (3.796)    (6.447) 
High  Sch  10.769    17.748    3.627    10.034    3.388    7.714 
  (7.120)    (11.801)   (2.577)    (9.361)    (2.954)    (5.107) 
Some  Coll  23.965***   34.443***   10.766***   21.087**   7.862**   13.356** 
  (7.943)    (12.614)   (2.882)    (10.006)   (3.300)    (5.459) 
College 103.072***   150.674***   61.242***   93.442***   31.766***   57.232*** 
  (9.631)    (14.696)   (3.501)    (11.657)   (4.027)    (6.360) 
More  Coll  145.688***   218.180***   82.859***   144.204***   46.969***   73.976*** 
  (10.360)   (15.486)   (3.756)    (12.284)   (4.320)    (6.702) 
Hispanic  -13.600*   -34.615**   -8.038***   -21.595**   -6.442*  -13.020** 
  (8.034)    (13.540)   (2.936)    (10.740)   (3.388)    (5.860) 
Black   -35.579***   -71.863***   -14.184***   -41.510***   -18.091***   -30.353*** 
  (6.586)    (11.019)   (2.379)    (8.741)    (2.746)    (4.769) 
Female   -1.209    -5.095    -4.973**   -7.257    -0.578    2.162 
  (5.310)    (7.610)    (1.932)    (6.037)    (2.221)    (3.293) 
Ln  income 44.349***   67.538***   17.368***   46.888***   17.560***   20.650*** 
  (2.840)    (3.969)    (1.041)    (3.148)    (1.205)    (1.718) 
Constant  -503.476***   -764.305***   -219.109***   -572.005***   -202.902***   -192.300*** 
  (45.805)   (67.952)   (16.867)   (53.903)   (19.481)   (29.409) 
 
Adj.  R
2     0.16        0.24        0.10        0.18         0.13          0.17 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is divided by 1,000. Other controls include age, marital status, retirement status, number of children, a dummy 
for other race, and a dummy for those who are not asked the planning question. All data weighted using HRS household weights. Stars indicates levels of significance.     37
 
Table 8:  Estimates of Planning on Net Worth: OLS and Instrumental Variables 
Regressions  
Pooled Sample, EBB and 1992 HRS (N=5,857) 
 
  OLS estimate  IV estimate 
Net Worth   0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
-0.00008 
(0.0002) 
    
Hausman Test (P-Value) 
 
 0.59 
(0.44) 
 
Note: This table reports OLS and IV regressions of planning on total net worth (net worth divided by 1,000.)  Standard 
errors in parenthesis with p-value in parenthesis for Hausman test. All data weighted using HRS household weights.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     38
Figure 1.  Reported Probability of Selling House to Finance Retirement: EBB Respondents 
2004 
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All data weighted using HRS household weights. 
 
 
  
  
Figure 2: Financial Literacy by Education and Race/Ethnicity: EBB Respondents (2004) 
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Note: All data weighted using HRS household weights. 
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